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Troubling Law’s Indefinite Detention: Disability, the Carceral Body and 
Institutional Injustice 
Recently, in Australia indefinite detention in prison through the forensic mental health system 
of disabled people1 (particularly Indigenous Australian disabled people) has been the subject 
of media attention, legal inquiries and international human rights condemnation (see, eg, 
Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee 2016). Indefinite detention has become 
articulated as a key site of disabled institutional injustice. Ending indefinite detention through 
shifting disabled people to definite periods of detention, ideally in the community, has 
become the focus of political discussion and disability rights advocacy (Cadwallader et al, 
forthcoming). I take this current moment in the politics of disabled indefinite detention as an 
entry point into a broader consideration of the possible limits of articulating institutional 
injustice by reference to the legal concept of indefinite detention. 
Indefinite detention is a temporally and spatially defined legal phenomenon. Indefinite 
detention is conventionally understood as involving confinement pursuant to a legal or 
administrative order which provides no clearly defined time period for or end date to this 
confinement. Confinement is in a material architectural space legislated or otherwise 
purposed as a place of detention or secure containment (e.g. prison, mental health facility) 
(Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee, 2016: 5). Some critical legal scholars 
have argued that law’s representation of time and space can obscure our ability to see 
injustice, notably the complicity of law in institutional injustices (see, e.g., Mawani, 2014; 
Veitch, 2007). This article questions the assumptions about time and space and related 
dichotomies of indefinite/definite and detention/liberty that mediate the legal concept of 
indefinite detention.  
By drawing on critical disability studies to critique time and space at the intersections of 
disability and law, this article identifies  and  troubles the ‘curative’ (Kafer, 2013) or 
therapeutic interventionist impulse that sustains disabled people’s exposure to detention and 
other coercive interventions across multiple jurisdictions, material spaces, legally ordered 
events and routine disability service provision. Through a case study of the official state 
                                                          
1 This article uses the term ‘disabled’ to refer specifically to people with cognitive disabilities and mental health 
impairments, collectively those typically deemed in law as ‘incapable’ and subject to disability-specific 
interventions (Steele, 2014). It should be noted that some Indigenous Australian people resist definitions of 
disability (First Peoples Disability Network, 2016; Sotiri & Simpson, 2005-2006: 432-433, 440-441). 
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representation of the institutional life course of one Indigenous Australian woman who is 
disabled I demonstrate that across multiple jurisdictions, legal orders, service systems, 
material spaces and modes of intervention, law provides for the heightened carceral control of 
bodies on the basis of their designation as disabled. In being designated as disabled, bodies 
are positioned as necessarily and legitimately subjected to ongoing, persistent and 
multifarious control in a way paradigmatic of Foucault’s argument of the policed subject 
(Foucault, 1979: 293-308) such that the disabled body itself is a carceral site (Steele, 2017a). 
This control exceeds conventional liberal legal understandings of indefinite detention which 
are linked to the legal indeterminacy of one legally ordered period of confinement in a 
legislated closed environment. An analysis of how law orders, constructs and legitimates 
carceral control of disabled people troubles present understandings of indefinite detention and 
illuminates the limited notions of (in)justice that these understandings allow. As such, this 
article builds on the argument made by the late Penelope Pether in her unfinished work, 
Genealogies of Indefinite Detention, that historical practices of preventive detention of the 
mentally ill is a ‘paradigm case’ of indefinite detention. The article does so by showing that 
analysis of contemporary practices of detention and control of disabled people across 
multiple across multiple jurisdictions, legal orders, material spaces and modes of intervention 
can further enrich and complicate our understandings of indefinite detention (including 
relationships between indefinite detention and settler colonialism) and, in turn, provide more 
complex understandings of institutional injustice.  
I begin by introducing the theoretical and methodological approach. I then turn to a case 
study to carefully unpack the temporal and spatial dynamics of detention and broader carceral 
control of one Indigenous Australian woman who is disabled. I conclude by discussing the 
implications of my analysis for understanding the relationships between indefinite detention 
and institutional injustice. 
Law’s Time and Space in ‘Indefinite Detention’ 
Law’s designation of individuals as disabled has for centuries enabled the heightened 
indefinite detention of bodies across Australian (the focus of this article) and other western 
jurisdictions. This is by reason of ‘disability-specific’ laws, such as civil mental health laws 
enabling detention for the purposes of medical treatment and care, guardianship laws 
enabling detention in locked accommodation, forensic mental health laws enabling detention 
following a finding of unfitness or not guilty by mental illness and laws permitting restrictive 
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practices typically within institutional spaces such as group homes, aged care facilities, 
schools and mental health facilities. Recent scholarship has begun to explore the colonial and 
racial underpinnings of the historical emergence, evolution and contemporary operation of 
disability-specific laws enabling indefinite detention (see, e.g., Blagg, Tulich & Bush, 2017; 
Joseph, 2015). This recent scholarship can be situated in a broader context of critical 
disability scholarship which has argued  that constructions of disability as ‘abnormality’ or 
‘unfitness’ are situated in ongoing and ever-evolving settler colonial projects of rule (see, 
e.g., Erevelles, 2011; Hollinsworth, 2013).  
This article explores how contemporary practices of indefinite detention of disabled people 
relate to settler colonialism, particularly as these practices pertain to Indigenous women who 
are disabled. In doing so, this article is informed by the scholarship of Australian Indigenous 
women, which has illuminated the serious issues of violence, criminalisation and institutional 
injustice confronting Indigenous Australian women (see, e.g., Behrendt, 2000, 2005: 249; 
Porter, 2016; Watson, 2007: 7-8, 2016). Indeed, Watson has noted the failure of the 
Australian state and legal system to acknowledge and remedy colonialism per se (Watson, 
2007: 7) and has argued that Australian settler colonial law is itself illegitimate because it is 
founded on violent imposition through terra nullius (Watson 2014, 52-53), while Moreton-
Robinson has argued that ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’ has infused personhood in law 
(Moreton-Robinson, 2004). Writing in the North American context,  Dian Million (Tanana 
Athabascan) has argued that settler colonial legal and political systems respond to Indigenous 
historical injustice pursuant to a neoliberal and interventionist logic that  draws on 
medicalised notions of trauma. These medical notions of trauma in turn individualise harm 
and further impedes self-determination (Million, 2013: 11-12, 40). Million also notes that 
state legal jurisdiction is increasingly being extended over Indigenous people’s land and lives 
as a strategy of colonial rule (Million, 2000: 102). A similar point has been made by some 
Indigenous Australian women scholars, notably in relation to the Northern Territory 
intervention (Watson, 2007).  
These issues of violence, criminalisation and institutional injustice confronting Indigenous 
Australian women have been explored in different ways by non-Indigenous Australian 
scholars. These settler colonial and critical disability approaches offer an explanatory 
framework for ongoing dispossession and systemic subordination. For example, Eileen 
Baldry, Chris Cunneen and colleagues have argued that Indigenous Australian women are 
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subjected to ‘colonial patriarchy’ (Baldry, Carlton and Cunneen, 2015) and that patriarchal 
colonialism has the ‘power to adapt and endure’ (Baldry and Cunneen, 2014: 285) including 
recent manifestations in the increasing incarceration of Indigenous Australian women 
(Cunneen and Rowe, 2015). Canadian scholars such as Chris Chapman and Jijian Voronka 
have tracked the ways in which disability diagnoses and interventions are increasingly being 
used to manage First Nations populations, rendering carceral interventions medically 
necessary, beneficial and ‘noncolonial’ (Chapman, 2014a; see similarly Voronka, 2013; on 
colonisation, mental health and the Global South see Mills 2014). Canadian feminist and 
critical race scholar Sherene Razack has discussed the way in which pathologising the 
precarity of First Nations offenders’ contact with the justice system renders inevitable and 
legitimate their exposure to institutional violence and death (Razack, 2015). Together, this 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholarship directs critical attention to the interrelationships 
between violence, criminalisation and institutionalisation and the ways in which control of 
Indigenous people’s lives and bodies is achieved not only through race but also through the 
legal prisms of disability and health.  
Some critical legal scholars have argued that appreciating the full scope of institutional 
injustice requires questioning law’s complicity in harms, not only materially through what 
law permits to be enacted on bodies, but also law’s cultural or representational dominance in 
the meaning given to these material practices and the material bodies on which they are 
enacted (Cover, 1986; Veitch, 2007). To this end, one dimension of critical legal scholarship 
which this article draws upon is attentiveness to legal representations of space and time. 
Legal authority and action can be understood as not being open ended but rather as ‘defined 
by limitations that [law] defines for itself’ and that [law’s] representations of its own legal 
and material boundaries circumvents claims made to its legitimacy (Douglas, Sarat and 
Umphrey, 2005: 9, emphasis in original). Moreover, some critical legal scholars have 
explored how injustices done to marginalised groups can be illuminated through 
understanding the marginalised body as a space (Delaney, 2003; Steele, 2017a) or the way in 
which the marginalised body has a porous relationship with material space which is mediated 
by law such that bodies ‘take space with them’ (Keenan, forthcoming). Moreover, some 
critical legal scholars have argued that law does not act on objective understandings of time, 
but produces time in ways that align with law’s objectives and affirms law’s legitimacy. 
Renisa Mawani has noted that ‘juridical concepts, legal discourses, and legal authority are 
underwritten by and draw their meanings from the production, specification, and arrangement 
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of time’ (2014: 71). Yet, Mawani comments that ‘[a]lthough time is crucial to [law’s] force 
and legitimacy, and its onto-epistemology – in legal scholarship, law’s time has too often 
been assumed rather than problematized’ (2014: 69). Law can produce time in order to 
fragment relations between events, spaces or people to render incomprehensible injustices 
(Mawani, 2014: 93). Critical legal scholarship on law, space and time orients us towards 
questioning the political limits of representations of space and time in conventional legal 
conceptualisations of indefinite detention. 
In analysing indefinite detention specifically in relation to disability it is important to 
consider how law represents disabled bodies it (lawfully) detains. Critical disability studies 
scholarship provides tools for critiquing constructions of disability as individual, biomedical 
deficit and illuminating disability’s status as a socially constructed abnormality. In turn, this 
scholarship can make apparent the contingency of law’s representations of disability to 
broader historical and geopolitical dimensions of power and inequality related to such 
dynamics as colonialism, neoliberalism and globalisation. Drawing on critical disability 
studies scholarship means that disability is not analytically approached as a discrete, 
additional category of difference but instead is always coming into existence co-relationally 
with other dimensions of difference such as gender, race and sexuality in ways that reproduce 
the white male ‘normate’ subject (and in turn nation) (Connell, 2011; Erevelles, 2011; 
Hollinsworth, 2013; Soldatic, 2015; see also a similar point advanced in the disability justice 
approach developed by US activists such as Patty Berne, Mia Mingus and Lydia YZ Brown).  
Furthermore, analysis of law’s representation of disability as abnormality considers the legal 
possibilities for control and violence enlivened both in relation to those designated as 
disabled, and the mutually constituted normate legal subject (see, generally, Campbell, 2009; 
Goodley, 2014). Such consideration includes the colonial and racial dimensions of 
confinement and other non-consensual interventions of bodies designated as disabled which 
can expose certain racialized sub-populations of disabled people to greater risk of violence 
and death (see, e.g., Puar 2017; Wadiwel, 2017). Analysis also extends to considering the 
carnal dimensions of law’s representational and material approach to disability in two 
respects. One respect is how lawful techniques for regulating disability work through the 
body (notably through diagnosis and therapeutic interventions). The other is how discourses 
of care, humanitarianism and benevolence which mobilise certain affective responses to the 
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disabled body are harnessed to mask the regulative, punitive, violent, indeed even lethal, 
effects of these interventions on disabled bodies.  
Some critical disability scholarship has drawn attention to the significance of temporality, 
both in relation to how disability is constructed as abnormality and disabled people are 
devalued and subjected to greater levels of permissible violence (Kafer 2013; Steele 2018 
forthcoming; for a historical perspective see Baynton 2011). For example, Alison Kafer 
(2013) has argued that disability is understood as an unwanted form of existence such that 
disabled people cannot be valued in the present and can only be valued in the future if they 
are no longer disabled. Thus, according to Kafer, where ‘disability is conceptualized as a 
terrible unending tragedy … [a] better future … is one that excludes disability and disabled 
bodies’ (2). As such, therapeutic interventions become understood and accepted within a 
‘curative imaginary’: ‘an understanding of disability that not only expects and assumes 
intervention but also cannot imagine or comprehend anything other than intervention’ (27, 
emphasis added). Critical disability scholarship, notably Kafer’s concept of the ‘curative’, 
encourages us to question the self-evidence of indefinite detention and other coercive 
interventions, notably when these are justified on the basis of support and therapy and when 
they are of an ongoing and routine nature.  Moreover, the notion of disabled people as ‘fixed’ 
in time resonates with the temporal construction of Indigenous people as pre-modern and 
inevitably destined for premature death and annihilation (Razack 2015; for a historical 
exploration of the emergence of these intersections see Baynton 2011), and directs critical 
attention to the racialized and settler colonial dimensions of indefinite detention of 
Indigenous Australians who are disabled. 
Recent critical disability scholarship is drawing out the carceral quality of coercive 
interventions and control of disabled people (what I refer to as ‘disability carceral 
scholarship’). For example, in their introduction to a ground breaking edited collection on 
disability and incarceration, Chris Chapman, Alison C Carey and Liat Ben-Moshe propose 
that the diversity of sites in which people with disability have been confined over the 
centuries constitutes an ‘institutional archipelago’ (Chapman et al. 2014:14). They argue that 
across individuals’ lives and across macro policy shifts, disabled bodies have been confined 
within and moved between sites of confinement such that any ‘freedom’ from one site of 
confinement generally results in entry of these bodies into and confinement in another 
(Chapman et al. 2014). Disability carceral scholarship troubles accepted understandings of 
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institutionalisation and incarceration in order to illuminate the carceral quality of a broader 
range of sites such as family homes, disability group homes, mental health facilities, and 
special education schools. Many of these sites are particular to people with disability and are 
typically viewed as therapeutic, benign and even empowering. In so doing, disability carceral 
scholars displace the prison as the exclusive or primary site of disabled carceral practices and 
unsettle the therapeutic logic that negates the carcerality of disability-specific spaces of 
confinement (see, e.g., Adams & Erevelles 2017; Ben-Moshe 2017; Ben-Moshe et al. 2014; 
Dowse 2017; Joseph 2015; McCausland & Baldry 2017; Spivakovsky & Seear 2017; 
Spivakovsky 2014a; 2014b; 2017; Steele 2017; Voronka 2013; Wadiwel 2017). In a 
contribution to this scholarship, recently, I argued that the possibility (and indeed the legality) 
of the multiple forms of disability-specific coercive intervention in relation to disabled people 
is not attached to a particular material architectural space or a particular court order, but 
instead attaches to these individuals’ bodies via medico-legal designations as disabled and 
travels with these individuals through time and space such that it is the disabled body that is 
the site of carcerality and hence the disabled body makes material architectural spaces 
carceral (Steele, 2017a; see also in relation to restrictive practices Steele 2018 forthcoming).  
Drawing on these critical legal and critical disability approaches I propose that divisions 
made between indefinite and definite detention and between detention and liberty are 
referrable to legal representations of time and space. ‘Indefinite detention’ is ‘indefinite’ 
because a legal order (e.g. court order, administrative order) for a specific instance of 
detention provides no end date and it is ‘detention’ because it involves confinement in a 
closed material, architectural space, legally authorised and designated to provide such 
detention (e.g. a prison, mental health facility, immigration detention facility). What is 
conventionally understood as indefinite detention is defined by reference to law’s 
understanding of time – how law sets (or, does not set) the period of confinement and by 
reference to a detention ‘event’ circumscribed by the individual legal order and its related 
legal process. The principal injustices of what is conventionally understood as indefinite 
detention are the temporal uncertainty of the singular legally ordered event of detention and 
being confined in a walled space as compared to being ‘at liberty’ in the ‘community’. My 
analysis will signal the need to exercise caution both in taking at face value law’s 
representation of indefinite detention and, in turn, in measuring the ‘justice’ of carceral 
control against the legal temporal ordering of detention into in/definite detention or more 
broadly against legal principles of freedom of liberty, non-arbitrariness and procedural 
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fairness. Caution is required because a legally-oriented approach could risk erasing other 
forms of institutional injustice beyond those that are referrable to law’s own temporal and 
spatial points of reference.  
I now turn to explore one disabled individual’s indefinite detention in the context of broader 
institutional dynamics of detention and coercive intervention as a way to trouble law’s 
representation of time and space in indefinite detention and illuminate broader institutional 
injustices of disabled people in the criminal justice system. 
Methodology for Troubling Law’s ‘Indefinite Detention’ 
Methodologically, I take as my focus one embodied individual’s travels across different legal 
spaces, modes of intervention and periods of carceral control as a way to work outside of the 
temporal and spatial logic of law’s representation of indefinite detention. I do so through a 
case study of the institutional life course of one Indigenous Australian woman who is 
disabled (‘Wendy’2), as represented in official administrative records held by various 
government departments. Wendy’s case study was drawn from the ‘People with Mental 
Health Disorders and Cognitive Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System in New South 
Wales’ dataset (‘MHDCD dataset’), which is a cohort of 2,731 men and women who have 
been in prison in New South Wales, Australia, most of whom have been designated in the 
data as having cognitive impairment and/or mental illness diagnosis. The MHDCD dataset 
contains linked data on the life-long human services and criminal justice involvement of each 
individual, and was constructed by merging extant administrative records from criminal 
justice and human service agencies such as Attorney General’s, Corrective Services, Police, 
Health and Community Services. Data indicates demographics, criminal justice contacts, 
social and health factors, and disability service usage.3 
 ‘Wendy’ is a 46 year old and Indigenous Australian woman. Wendy is designated by health 
and justice agencies as having cognitive and psychosocial disabilities. The majority of the 
data on Wendy were quantitative detailing episodes of service use. However, the data also 
include police events narrative which is the qualitative written running record of specific 
                                                          
2 De-identified. 
3 The author’s ethics approval for this empirical research was granted by the University of Sydney Human 
Research Ethics Committee: Protocol No 14568. This ethics approval was ratified by the University of New 
South Wales Human Research Ethics Committee: HREC Ref No HC12071. The larger IAMHDCD project was 
granted ethics approval by the University of New South Wales HREC, NSW AHMRC and individual 
Aboriginal organisations with which the team worked (Baldry et al, 2015: p. 27).  
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instances of contact an individual has had with police over their life – as an alleged offender 
(‘person of interest’ or ‘POI’), victim and as a ‘mentally ill person’ under civil mental health 
legislation. Drawing on these data, a case study was constructed of Wendy’s institutional life 
course and in this article I trace the official state representations of Wendy’s movements in 
and out of indefinite detention and between different forms of contact with criminal justice, 
health and human service agencies.  
In drawing on institutional data, the intention is not to displace or negate the scholarship and 
perspectives of Indigenous Australian women on their lives and experiences, noting the lack 
of recognition of the perspectives of Indigenous women and privileging of western 
epistemologies (see, e.g., Moreton-Robinson, 2011; Porter, 2017; Watson, 2011; in the 
specific context of Indigenous women who are disabled and who experience violence see 
Cripps, Miller & Saxton-Barney, 2010: 4). Certainly, relying upon institutional data of the 
administration of law is itself to draw on a set of representations which are laden with their 
own logics and legitimacy about law (Rajah, 2016). As such, I use institutional data not to 
indicate a normative truth of the subjective experiences of ‘Wendy’ or of disabled Indigenous 
Australian women more broadly, but instead for the purpose of challenging law’s self-
representation of indefinite detention and, in destabilising this self-representation, open up a 
space for others to contribute their alternative representations and experiences of carceral 
control and its injustices.  
Wendy’s case study has been selected as the focus of discussion in this article because the 
high number of contacts with police, incidents of incarceration and involvement with mental 
health and disability services enables a particularly powerful and nuanced illumination of the 
complexity and multi-layered nature of disabled carceral control. While Wendy’s institutional 
life course is particular to her, it is significant to note that research by Baldry, Dowse and 
others on the MHDCD dataset more broadly indicates that Wendy’s pattern of control is not 
unique to her. Baldry, Dowse and colleagues have identified that cohort members had 
ongoing police contact as persons of interest (as well as victims of crime and under civil 
mental health legislation) and periods of incarceration over their lives, as well as 
experiencing significant social disadvantage as adults and early childhood disadvantage 
through poor education outcomes, high rates of out of home care and contact with juvenile 
justice (Baldry et al. 2012). Baldry, Dowse and others also found that Indigenous Australians 
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in the MHDCD cohort, particularly Indigenous Australian women with multiple diagnoses, 
were some of the most criminalised and disadvantaged (Baldry et al. 2015). 
I now turn to draw out a number of dimensions in Wendy’s institutional contact. This 
discussion is structured thematically rather than chronologically. 
A Range of ‘Indefinite Detention’ Options 
Wendy is subject to periods of indefinite detention under civil mental health legislation, 
guardianship law and on remand in New South Wales, Australia, as well as being subjected 
to multiple periods of definite detention and other forms of coercive intervention by a range 
of criminal justice and human service agencies.4 My discussion of Wendy begins in the 
‘familiar’ territory of conventional indefinite detention. Wendy is subjected to a number of 
periods of indefinite detention under civil mental health legislation. One of these is at age 32 
where she was involuntary detained in a mental health hospital upon release from a one year 
period of sentenced incarceration. During this period of detention, hospital staff reported 
Wendy as having ‘absconded’ and request police to immediately return her if she is found. 
This period of indefinite detention lasts only 2 weeks because Wendy is charged with 
property related offences and is remanded in custody. Wendy is not only subject to disability-
specific indefinite detention. Wendy has 41 adult prison custody episodes over a space of 19 
years. Around half of these are instances of indefinite detention on remand awaiting trial (21) 
for periods ranging from 1 day to 7.5 months.  
The forms of detention just mentioned do not depart from the familiar territory of 
conventional indefinite detention – all involve undefined periods of confinement in 
legislatively purposed places of detention. Yet, even within the contours of conventional 
indefinite detention, it is apparent that disability enables additional opportunities for 
indefinite detention. For Wendy, civil mental health indefinite detention is not an alternative 
                                                          
4 Wendy’s case study is drawn from a project on diversion of people with cognitive impairment from the 
criminal justice system consisting of quantitative data (Steele, Dowse and Trofimovs, 2016) and qualitative data 
involving four case studies of offenders with disability. The sampling of the four case studies was purposive in 
order to capture individuals who have particularly complex diagnoses and criminal justice pathways. Ethics 
approval for this empirical research was granted by the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics 
Committee: Protocol No 14568. This ethics approval was ratified by the University of New South Wales Human 
Research Ethics Committee: HREC Ref No HC12071. This study is a nested study within the Australian 
Research Council (ARC) Linkage project, 'People with Mental Health Disorders and Cognitive Disabilities 
(MHDCD) in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) in NSW', University of NSW – Chief Investigators E. Baldry, 
L. Dowse and I. Webster.  See generally Australians with MHDCD in the CJS Project (29 June 2012) Mental 
Health Disorders and Cognitive Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System 
<http://www.mhdcd.unsw.edu.au/australians-mhdcd-cjs-project.html>.  
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to mainstream indefinite detention. Rather across her life she is legally designated at various 
times legally capable or incapable, travelling between different jurisdictional domains of 
criminal law and forensic and civil mental health law and is ultimately subject to both forms 
of indefinite detention.  
Multiple and Generative Nature of ‘Definite’ Disabled Confinement 
Wendy is also subjected to 20 periods of sentenced definite detention in prison, cycling in 
and out of relatively short periods of detention ranging from 5 days to 13 months. Thus, 
additional to conventional indefinite detention she is also subjected to definite detention 
which, in its frequency and its nature of generating further opportunities for additional 
detention, is rendered ‘indefinite’ in the sense of being recurring and routinized. As such, the 
indefinite/definite detention divide is largely artificial where one is subject to multiple 
successive periods of detention with no clear end to this cycle. In its submission to the 
Indefinite Detention Australian Senate Inquiry, the First Peoples Disability Network (2016) 
referred to the ‘recurrent and indefinite detention’ to capture this phenomenon of ongoing 
periods of definite detention (see also Steele 2016b). 
While in adult custody, Wendy is charged with 127 offences in custody, primarily for 
intimidation, disobeying directions and abusive language. Wendy is noted as being a 
‘management problem’ in custody and as having a ‘[h]istory of aggression and harm to 
others’. She spends a number of periods in ‘protective’ custody, as well as periods in 
segregation for disciplinary reasons. Therefore, additional to multiple periods of 
imprisonment, it is significant that these periods of imprisonment are themselves generative 
of new possibilities within prison for detention in different spaces and subjection to coercive 
interventions (‘micro carceral practices’) (see also Spivakovsky 2017). Wendy is not only 
segregated for disciplinary reasons. She also has 40 recorded instances of self-harm during 
her short prison episodes. For a number of these she is segregated. Wendy’s self-harm and 
her subsequent isolation is reflective of the argument that the complex relationship between 
pre-existing disability, the circumstances of prison per se and the use of segregation and 
isolation for those at risk gives rise to a ‘maddening’ effect of prison (Ben-Moshe, 2017: 280-
282) – and, for our purposes, state complicity in the disablement and injustices against 
incarcerated Indigenous Australians who are disabled. 
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While in prison, Wendy reports to police incidents of violence by other inmates. For 
example, just before her 31st birthday, Wendy reports having been sexually assaulted by two 
female inmates while serving a sentence of custody. She discloses these incidents during a 
court appearance. The police events narrative states:  
It is the belief of the prison staff that the victim will be sentenced to a mental 
institute for a period of time and that she only brought up the allegation of sexual 
assault to the judges attention so as the judge would go easy on her. 
Due to the victim’s mental capacity, the fact that the descriptions of the cell mates 
do not match the actual cell mates, the times of the incident and the continued 
changing of the victim story, it is doubtful that any sexual assault took place. … 
The victim is a rather large female who has a history within the prison system of 
being violent towards herself, other prisoners and prison officers. The description 
given by the victim of the two offenders does not fit with the victim being so 
easily over powered. The victim is a rather large, strong female. 
In constructing Wendy as both cunning and incapable, police negate the possibility of 
Wendy’s victimisation in prison by reference to norms of gender, ability and non-
criminality/compliance (including by reference to her history of offences committed while in 
custody) (see further Steele 2017b). Across Wendy’s institutional pathways, disability is 
deployed or erased to suit particular, specific institutional outcomes – here not investigating 
sexual assault and keeping her in prison. This deployment of disability is arguably an 
additional carceral effect of state sanctioned violence that follows from indefinite and definite 
detention (Steele, 2016a) and in turn points to the complex institutional entanglements of 
victimisation and criminalisation. Yet, being designated as disabled conceals these injustices 
in the body under the guise of pathology, a point noted by Million who has argued in the 
North American context that medicalised notions of trauma have resulted in rape of 
Indigenous women being criminalised or trivialised through therapeutic intervention (Million, 
2013: 11-12, 40).  
For Wendy, police custody constitutes a further carceral space. When Wendy is not in 
Department of Corrective Services custody, she has multiple police custody episodes 
generally while she is waiting to be charged or interviewed, and including for breaches of 
bail. For the 12 year period of available data (from the age of 27 to age 39) Wendy has 
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around 76 police custody episodes. As her contact with police begins when she is 13 years 
old and hence the available data is for only half of the years of her police contact, it is likely 
that she has had many more police custody episodes than what is in the data.  
A number of scholars, across Australia and Canada, have argued that a medicalised approach 
to disability opens up new criminal justice possibilities for Indigenous people in settler 
colonial contexts (see, e.g., Chapman, 2014a; Voronka, 2013; Baldry, McCausland, Dowse & 
McIntyre, 2015). These new criminal justice possibilities are evident in relation to Wendy’s 
subjection to conventional indefinite and definite detention. The fact that these additional 
possibilities for incarceration are by reason of her designation as legally incapable (via 
diagnosed disability) rather than directly by reason of her Indigeneity allows law to represent 
incarceration as ‘noncolonial’ (Chapman, 2014a) and  disconnected from larger political 
issues of race and colonisation, including intergenerational and historical dimensions.  
My analysis so far challenges the limits of in/definite detention as a framework for 
articulating institutional injustice by troubling the temporal assumptions in this dichotomy. 
This dichotomy not only masks the effects of multiple periods of ‘definite’ detention, but also 
the focus on the ‘indefinite’ legal order as the site of in/justice focuses on the clean, desk-
based moment of the order of detention itself and hides the material and carnal effects of 
incarceration regardless of its time period and casts these effects beyond law’s responsibility 
(Cover, 1986) and legal understandings of injustice.5 In focusing on the order, the ‘disabling 
effects and legitimacy of the prison remain intact’ (Ben-Moshe, 2017: 285). Indefinite 
detention, as conventionally understood, contributes to a ‘legally ordered suffering’ (Veitch 
2007; on law’s complicity in historical suffering of Indigenous Australians, see Van Rijswijk 
and Anthony 2015). I will now problematize the spatiality of indefinite detention, which rests 
on a detention/liberty divide. I focus on the community (and, indeed, the body) as a carceral 
space for Wendy. 
Beyond ‘Detention’ Spaces: The Community and the Body as Carceral 
Wendy’s first recorded police contact as a POI is at 13 years of age for stealing. Wendy has 
around 240 charges principally for low-level property-related offences, assault and breach of 
bail in the space of 25 years of available data. However, she has around 330 recorded 
                                                          
5 Indeed, a similar problem arises in legal pedagogy where, e.g., criminal law teaching finishes at the legal 
moment of sentencing, with no teaching of the legal framework of incarceration itself, including the laws 
regulating micro carceral practices. 
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contacts with police as a POI and an additional 30 contacts as a victim and 25 contacts as a 
‘patient’ under civil mental health legislation. Wendy has more frequent contact with police 
than her formal criminal charges suggest, and this contact begins at an early age. As such her 
detention is but one aspect of a broader pattern of control through the criminal justice system, 
such that the ‘community’ is itself a carceral space for Wendy.  
There are two key features that characterise Wendy’s contact with police as a POI which 
enrich and complicate spatial dynamics of conventional ‘detention’. I will now turn to discuss 
these features.  
Control in Out of Home Care 
Wendy’s earliest contact with police is as a missing person while in out of home care 
(‘OOHC’). Wendy is in OOHC as a child, having been removed from her parents at 2 years 
old. The data is scant during her early teens, but it seems that in her late teens she comes to 
the attention of police on a number of occasions for ‘absconding’ from OOHC and has 
contact with police as a ‘missing person’. This contact as a missing person slowly morphs 
into contact with police for low level offending in the community such as shoplifting, 
showing the fluidity of ‘care’ and ‘crime’ for Wendy (see similarly Trofimovs & Dowse, 
2014: 394).  
It is not only that OOHC generates contact with police and channelling into detention, but 
that OOHC itself takes on a carceral quality evident in the use by police of the term 
‘absconding’ and the role of police in conveying young persons back to their residence (with 
no indication in the data that police query the reasons underlying Wendy running away from 
her residence). Wendy quickly goes from being ‘at risk’ to ‘a risk’ (Baldry, 2014: 376). It is 
also significant that as an adult Wendy has children who are removed from her care by the 
state, thus suggesting the intergenerational nature of this mode of carceral control which is 
reflected in the literature on the significance of child removal policies to the ongoing 
disadvantage experienced by Indigenous Australians (Cunneen and Libesman, 2000: 102–
103). Yet, the criminalisation of Wendy in OOHC and her subsequent positioning by the state 
as both a criminal and disabled/mentally ill (arguably both possible by reason of the material 
effects of being in OOHC), individualises the historical and structural injustices of 
intergenerational and cyclical child removal and broader settler colonial dispossession 
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(Chapman, 2014a; Voronka, 2013; see generally Anthony 2018 forthcoming), concealing 
these historic and ongoing injustices in the deviancy and pathology of her body. 
Control through Disability ‘Support’ 
Wendy is also detained in ‘[u]nexpected spaces of confinement’ (Adams & Erevelles, 2017). 
At age 31 Wendy begins to live in community disability supported accommodation with case 
management and behaviour intervention and support, following a period in prison and 
subsequent indefinite detention in a mental health facility. From that time until when the data 
end, Wendy moves between prison and various supported disability accommodation settings 
and locations: group homes, hospital based large scale accommodation and specialist forensic 
community disability supported accommodation with 24 hour supervision. Wendy’s case 
study illustrates that the relations that order disability accommodation spaces in the 
‘community’ provide new possibilities for police contact and that these new relations trouble 
the distinction undergirding the in/justice of indefinite detention between detention and 
liberty which grounded in material architectural legislatively purposed places of detention.  
While in disability supported accommodation Wendy has contact with police in relation to 
property damage and assault against disability support service property and staff, seemingly 
because she is frustrated with the control dynamics in the accommodation. For example, one 
incident described by police in their events narrative states that Wendy ‘was refused her daily 
cigarette by centre staff. The POI, who suffers from a multitude of mental disorders, 
responded to this by, and perhaps not surprising, smashed a window in protest’. Wendy also 
has contact with police related to self-harming in the accommodation setting, sometimes after 
an altercation with staff. At times the self-harming is dismissed in police events narrative as 
attention seeking (see generally Steele, 2017b).  
The criminal and civil legal orders which order both Wendy’s (coerced) presence in disability 
service space and the relations between her and staff also provide new possibilities for police 
contact in the ‘community’. At times, Wendy’s location in accommodation is linked to 
criminal legal orders including bail, good behaviour bonds, and court diversion orders that 
allow her to remain in the community conditional upon her residing at disability 
accommodation and/or following the directions of her case manager and staff of the 
accommodation. The orders place supervision and reporting obligations on the service staff, 
which means that staff must then report breaches of the orders to police, for example if 
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Wendy does not return to the accommodation at night. It is notable that Wendy does spend 
periods of time in prison during the time she has accessed disability supported 
accommodation.  
Furthermore, Wendy is under a guardianship order that includes a retrieval order. This order 
means that Wendy’s public guardian makes decisions about where Wendy is to live and if 
Wendy does not live at this address then her guardian has the authority to contact the police 
to request that they coercively return her to that accommodation. As an aside, police are 
similarly involved in coercive retrieval and enforcement of ‘treatment’ in the context of 
community mental health treatment orders, which are seen as a community-based 
‘alternative’ to involuntary detention and treatment in mental health facilities (for a critique 
of community treatment orders, see Fabris 2011; see also Beaupert 2018). Wendy has police 
contact relating to absconding from the accommodation — as she is coerced to stay there and 
the service has an obligation to notify police that she is missing either pursuant to her 
guardianship order (with retrieval order) or pursuant to a criminal legal order. In one 
institutional accommodation setting, Wendy is noted in the police events narratives as 
‘absconding’ from the accommodation nearly every second day. Ultimately, whether she is 
charged depends in part on how supportive her case manager and the accommodation 
workers are. Moreover, while not apparent from the available data, disability group homes 
exercise their own systems of micro-rule through behaviour support plans and related systems 
of rewards, incentives and penalties including restrictive practices (Spivakovsky, 2017: 371-
375; Steele, 2014: 282, 285). Importantly, while criminal legal orders come and go depending 
on Wendy’s offending and the temporal limits of a instance of remand/bail or sentence, the 
guardianship order is ongoing because it is linked to Wendy’s decision making capacity and 
hence to her very self (see also Steele, 2017a). The guardianship order can be read by 
reference to Kafer’s concept of the ‘curative impulse’ such that not only is there a range of 
therapeutic legal options available to detain and control Wendy within the ‘community’ 
(which includes guardianship orders), but they are invoked in a largely non-reflexive, self-
evident and routine manner. 
Therefore, Wendy’s case study demonstrates how the ‘community’ including the ‘disability 
supported’ community provides opportunities for confinement outside of prison or 
institutional ‘walls’ (which possibly exceed those within conventional detention spaces 
(Spivakovsky, 2017: 380)). These opportunities arise because the presence of Wendy in the 
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‘community’ is legally ordered by relations not only between Wendy and services (including 
OH&S laws, duty of care and governance (Spivakovsky, 2017: 375-379)) but between 
Wendy, services and police that demand coercion and control (e.g. parole, bail, guardianship 
and diversion orders that coerce individuals to remain at an address to comply with services) 
and some of these legally ordered relations are enlivened in an ongoing way by reason of 
Wendy’s disability. The disabled body itself is carceral (Steele, 2017a).  
As well as being subjected to a variety of material boundaries external to the body, such as 
prison, mental health facilities, disability supported accommodation, and ongoing police 
surveillance in public space, Wendy is confined from within her body in being subjected to 
legally ordered mental health medication through civil mental health laws. On at least one 
occasion Wendy is detained in a mental health facility because she refuses to take her 
medication while living in the community. While conventional legal conceptualisations of 
detention and restraint focus on external factors which restrict an individual’s movement, 
many interventions in the disability-specific context work to restrain and control from within 
(e.g. chemical restraint through forced medication) (Fabris, 2011). 
Wendy’s case study illustrates a number of ways in which the community, and particularly 
the ‘disability supported’ community, is a carceral space (Spivakovsky, 2017). While 
community sentence options are available to all offenders (e.g. probation, community service  
orders), what is different about Wendy is that her designation as disabled enables multiple 
layers of carceral control which are enlivened through disability and hence exceed a specific 
criminal charge and ultimately attach to her body. Some of these layers of control occur 
through legal orders (Steele, 2017a), but it is just as much the case that the ‘community’ 
disability profession (Spivakovsky, 2017) and ‘care professions’ (Chapman, 2014b) are 
structured (both institutionally and  ethically) in ways that enable more diffused, informal and 
routine control of disabled people. 
Confinement Through Movement 
Police have powers under civil mental health legislation and guardianship legislation to deal 
coercively with individuals if they appear to have a mental illness. In particular, where police 
believe the person is experiencing a mental health issue police can take an individual to a 
hospital for assessment by a medical practitioner with the view of possible ‘scheduling’ the 
individual to a mental health facility for involuntary containment and treatment. The 
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authority lies with medical and psychiatric professionals for determining whether they 
ultimately remain in the mental health facility or if they are instead shifted back into the 
hands of police. Thus additional to individuals being moved by police into hospitals, there is 
a real possibility of movement back out and into the responsibility of police, leading to a 
constant state of suspension between agencies.  
When Wendy is 34 years old, she resides (as a condition of various criminal legal orders 
including probation, bail and diversionary orders) in institutional disability supported 
accommodation based in a hospital. The hospital staff, clearly frustrated with Wendy’s 
behaviour (including her regularly running away from the centre), seek police assistance to 
move Wendy out of this accommodation through reporting her breaches of the various 
criminal legal orders which have placed her there and through seeking she be taken elsewhere 
to be assessed under civil mental health laws. In responding to such requests by hospital staff, 
the police events narrative notes the complexities of the mental requirements of criminal law 
and the resultant limitations of these mental requirements in relation to the scope of carceral 
control through criminal law. For example, seven months into her stay, Wendy is returned to 
the hospital after having absconded and then subsequently refuses to take her medication and 
becomes aggressive towards staff: 
Police attended to sight the [missing person ‘MP’]. Upon arrival Police viewed 
the MP she did appear agitated and a little aggressive. The Nurse Unit Manager 
[NUM] then stated that Police were to take the MP and have her charged as she 
had breached her bail conditions. Police observed the bail conditions and it was 
noted that in fact her conditions had not been broken as the MP was residing at 
the [centre]. There were no such bail condition in which stated that the accused 
was to be under mandatory supervision 24 hours a day. After Police informed the 
NUM of this the NUM then attempted again to have police remove the MP from 
the facility by taking her to [public mental health hospital] as they believed that if 
Police took the MP then [public mental health hospital] would mandatorily just 
accept her. The Staff were advised that this is not the case. Due to the MP already 
being in a Government facility Police believed that there was no need for the 
MP’s location to be altered. 
Therefore, while in earlier sections I have shown the variety of legal modes and spaces 
available to control Wendy particularly when her body is designated as disabled, she is also 
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subject to carceral control in the course of moving between these modes and spaces of able 
criminal and disabled patient, notably at that point of refused inclusion as a disabled patient 
which, contradictorily is on the basis of de-designation as disabled. De-designation as 
disabled supports the earlier point about the legal and institutional contingency and 
malleability of disability. Movement of Wendy between physical, institutional and diagnostic 
spaces is itself a dynamic of the carceral nature of disability, and goes to the notion that 
disability provides additional (rather than alternative) legal options for carceral control of 
disabled bodies.  
The Carceral Disabled Body and Legal Ordering of (In)justice 
By tracking Wendy’s movements through the administrative data in and ‘out’ of indefinite 
detention and between different forms of contact with criminal justice, health and human 
service agencies I have illuminated a continuous control dispersed across spaces and 
mediated by different institutions as ‘care’, ‘punishment’ and ‘protection’. Ultimately, 
Wendy is exposed to an ongoing continuum of practices of detention, coercive intervention 
and surveillance across material and legal spaces and hence to carceral control as both a 
disabled body and (depending on institutional and other dynamics of a specific institutional 
contact) a ‘normal’, criminal non-disabled body.  
Critical criminologists and critical disability studies scholars have argued that following de-
institutionalization there has been the ‘trans’-institutionalization of bodies designated as 
disabled due to a continuity and fluidity of institutional spaces (Ben-Moshe, 2017; Ben-
Moshe, Chapman and Carey, 2014). This article is novel insofar as it shows the limits of the 
legal concept of indefinite detention to capture the complexity and insidiousness of the 
carceral continuum specifically for disabled people who are charged with criminal offences. 
In particular indefinite detention cannot capture notably more ‘benevolent’ or ‘empowering’ 
forms of control that are typically proposed as progressive reform alternatives to conventional 
indefinite detention. My analysis through Wendy’s case study suggests that it is not merely 
the availability of multiple spaces within which disabled individuals can be confined but 
rather that disability itself is carceral such that the designation of disability to Wendy 
provides the heightened, indeed hyper, possibility for carceral control of that disabled body 
wherever she might be. Disability make space carceral because of the control that attaches to 
disabled bodies both by reason of legal orders (e.g. through guardianship and civil mental 
health orders) and because of the biopolitical regimes of diagnosis and ‘therapeutic’ 
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intervention pertaining to disability generally. As such people designated as disabled who are 
in the criminal justice system might be paradigmatic subjects of Foucauldian discipline 
(Steele, 2017a), including reflecting the temporal shift from the episodic control of sovereign 
power (here in its modern form of state ordered period of indefinite detention) to the more 
dispersed and ongoing control of biopower through continuous policing mediated by different 
institutions (Foucault, 1979: 293-308).6 Moreover, law not only governs individual instances 
of control but sits at the border points between different systems of control thus facilitating 
seamless movement between institutions and forms of control (on a similar point, see the 
argument that criminalised disabled people exist in a ‘liminal, marginalised 
community/criminal justice space’ (Baldry, 2010: 261; see also Baldry, Clarence, Dowse, & 
Trollor, 2013: 227)). 
This article is also novel in proposing that we need to be attentive to the intersections of 
Indigeneity and disability not only in the identities of the individuals subjected to disabled 
carceral control, but in the practices of carceral control themselves. The article builds on the 
argument by Chapman about the ‘noncolonial’ possibilities of disability-based carceral 
interventions and Million’s argument about the increased jurisdiction over Indigenous land as 
a form of colonial rule. Here it is the jurisdiction over the Indigenous body as a disabled body 
that both extends and deepens colonial rule and masks its continuities of control (and see also 
Blagg, Tulich & Bush, 2017: 345) through the apolitical and pathological prism of disability. 
The colonial patriarchy that once operated through segregation and institutionalisation 
(Baldry, Carlton and Cunneen, 2016) explicitly on the basis of Indigeneity now is more 
diffused and medicalised as disability and health. Far from being a ‘solution’ to addressing 
Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system, coercive health-based 
interventions are part of the problem. My analysis suggests the need for more careful 
consideration of how ‘colonial patriarchy’ relates to and harnesses disability in its ongoing 
adaptation and endurance (Baldry and Cunneen, 2014: 285) through ‘universal’ and non-race 
specific measures (286).  
Moreover, I have shown that carceral control of Wendy manifested in different material and 
institutional forms (both disabled and ‘non-disabled’) and was situated in different 
rationalities but remained consistent and pervasive in her life. This finding suggests that 
shifting from a dominant racial to disability legal, political and social discourse to rationalize 
                                                          
6 Thank you to Dinesh Wadiwel for this insightful point. 
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criminal justice and human service interventions in some Indigenous Australians’ lives and 
bodies does little to disrupt the control and violence they are subjected to. Indeed, the shift 
from race to disability might consolidate and extend control and violence through tapping 
into scientifically ‘objective’ and purportedly depoliticized (Kafer, 2013) temporal and carnal 
rationalizations of the carcerality of the disabled body. The switch from one mode of control 
to another (portrayed in progressive reformist agendas as shifting individuals into  ‘treatment’ 
and ‘support’ and out of prison) ignores the larger task of decolonizing both criminal justice 
and health/disability service systems (Blagg, Tulich & Bush, 2017: 335). In particular, the 
‘solution’ of the community group home is highly problematic (Chapman 2014b; 
Spivakovsky, 2017: 380; Steele 2017a). 
My analysis suggests that disability as a discrete category of subjects of indefinite detention  
‘matters’ here in a legal sense because of the disability-specific legal options, and that in 
turning to material disabled and racialized bodies the legal category of disability consolidates 
and extends the necropolitical management of Indigenous Australians. The designation of 
Indigenous Australians as disabled at its minimum results in a mundane and routinized ‘slow 
death’ (Nixon, 2013) as those designated remain caught within a complex legal network of 
incarceration and other forms of carceral control and their experiences of interpersonal and 
institutional violence remain unacknowledged, yet at the other extreme this designation can 
result in actual death in those situations when police resort to lethal shooting to deal with a 
mental health crisis, where individuals experience fatal institutional violence or when 
individuals self-harm and commit suicide in custody (see, e.g., Razack, 2015). Where 
Indigeneity itself is ‘lethal’, the carcerality of disability then heightens the exposure of 
Indigenous Australians to violence and death at the same time that the inherent racism and 
colonialism of this violence and death is negated under the guise of individual health issues 
which render inevitable these circumstances of heightened exposure (Chapman, 2014a; 
Razack, 2015; Puar, 2017).  
Positioning the disabled body itself as the site of carcerality (Steele 2017a) highlights the 
dangerous possibilities of control enlivened by disability which go even beyond Keenan’s 
observation (forthcoming) of the mobile carcerality of electronic tagging – here no electronic 
tag is necessary, only a diagnosis (or even a perception of a diagnosis in the case of police) 
and the disabled body can (to borrow from Keenan) take carceral space with it. Yet the notion 
of the body as a carceral site falls outside of the legal concept of indefinite detention which 
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my analysis suggests might be an ableist (and arguably also ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’ 
(Moreton-Robinson, 2004)) disembodied approach because it is based on the autonomous and 
closed body which is typically free from intervention beyond specific criminal legal orders 
and beyond the walls of specific places of detention. 
My analysis of disability and indefinite detention is significant not only for illuminating the 
ongoing carceral control of criminalised bodies designated as disabled, but also framing this 
control as an injustice. Mawani argues that ‘Law draws its meanings and gains its authorizing 
force through specifications and limits on time (minimum/maximum sentences or statute of 
limitations, for example) and through the temporalities it inhabits and brings into being’ 
(2014: 71). Ultimately, Wendy’s case study troubles legal understandings of incarceration to 
be too narrowly focused on temporal and spatial circumstances of particular legally ordered 
instances of detention. These legal understandings obfuscate causality and continuities 
between periods of detention and other forms of control, across jurisdictional domains and 
material spaces and from both outside and within the body. As Mawani states, ‘law produces, 
engages, and inscribes discontinuities between past, present and future to fortify its own 
authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy’ (Mawani, 2014: 69). Law’s ordering of time results in 
an ‘organised suffering’ (Veitch, 2007: 1) and, indeed, in the context of Indigenous 
Australians an organized annihilation (Razack, 2015). Law’s dispersing of control of bodies 
designated as disabled across different jurisdictions, different legal orders and different 
material spaces and modes of intervention gives a sense of incoherency across these and 
renders it difficult to attribute responsibility to the state and to law for harm that occurs over 
time, notably ‘suffering that accrues as part of an eviscerating daily life’ (van Rijswijk, 2015: 
332) by reason of indefinite carceral control.  
Using indefinite detention as a reference point for justice demands and progressive reforms 
only works in a liberal politics where people are viewed as autonomous, impermeable bodies 
which are otherwise free from coercive interventions beyond limited legal circumstances 
such as sentenced penalty. Such a liberal approach takes law’s account of itself at face value. 
In its deference to legal rights and process, this liberal approach erases law’s own complicity 
in carceral control and hides the relational and compounding nature of multiple legal 
instances of confinement and other forms of control, doing nothing to confront the carceral 
nature of the disabled body itself. A liberal approach to indefinite detention does not address 
and prevent future broader institutional injustices at stake which are hinted at in the 
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administrative data on Wendy: intergenerational child welfare interventions, impunity for 
sexual violence, and over-regulation by disability services. Through the individualising and 
pathologising effect of disability, Wendy’s possible injustices as deeply embedded structural 
effects of ongoing settler colonialism simply become her problems caused by her criminality 
and disability. Recasting indefinite detention of Indigenous Australians in terms of disability 
support in the community reduces structural and historical injustices of settler colonialism 
and ableism to individual medical issues (for a similar argument in the context of 
humanitarian immigration practices specific to asylum seekers  requiring medical care, see 
Tiktin 2011). There is no questioning of the political, historical and legal circumstances in 
which Wendy’s disability came about, including state, legal and institutional complicity in 
her disablement (Puar 2017). Moreover, the very fact of the lack of attention in the 
administrative data to state-perpetrated disablement, violence and injustice through coercive 
interventions (writ instead as nonviolent, mundane and routine administration of a body) is 
telling of how ‘legitimate’ official state administrative records themselves compound official 
judicial and legislative representations and epistemologies of the justice of indefinite 
detention and other forms of carceral control. As such, these administrative record keeping 
systems themselves might be important sites of political intervention (Steele, 2017b). 
Legal reform focused on moves from indefinite to definite detention risks working within and 
affirming binaries sustaining rather than undermining law’s legitimacy: indefinite/definite 
periods of detention, arbitrary/procedurally individualised and confinement/community. 
While such reform agendas are important in reducing the discrimination that results in the 
unequal distribution of indefinite detention within the population, my concern is that these 
reform agendas should not be an exhaustive strategy because they operate within oppressive 
ableist and settler colonial conditions of structural injustice (Anthony forthcoming) which are 
masked as objective, apolitical and medical. In shifting from a legal vantage point to 
determine the (in)justice of indefinite detention, to a carnal and material vantage point of the 
racialized and disabled body, it might be possible for law reform agendas to move beyond the 
legal subject bounded by one sentence, one place and one point in time, to see a body moving 
through time and space caught in a continuous control that attaches to their body. 
In thinking about the ‘unevenness of how populations live and get to live time’ (Puar, 2009: 
166) we must move beyond the limitations of legal understandings of temporality and 
spatiality of indefinite detention. As DL Adams and Nirmala Erevelles argue, we need to 
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think beyond rights and the liberal individual to an ontology of disabled life as valued and 
worth living (Adams & Erevelles, 2017: 362). To this end, we need more complex 
relationships between disability, law, institutions and violence in order to invigorate 
meanings of in/justice including a greater appreciation of the complicities of law, institutions 
and services in injustice (Baldry, Clarence, Dowse, & Trollor, 2013: 227) and in disability 
itself (Ben-Moshe, 2017: 282). In doing so, we can see and make the state account for a wider 
set of institutional injustices. 
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